## EXHIBIT A

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
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4	MICROSOFT CORPORATION, )
5	Plaintiff, ) 10-01823-JLR
6	v. ) SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
7	MOTOROLA INC., et al, ) April 11, 2012
8	Defendants. ) Court's Ruling )
9	
10	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12	
13 14	APPEARANCES:
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16	For the Plaintiff: Arthur Harrigan, Christopher
17	Wion, David Pritikin and Andy Culbert
18	
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20	For the Defendants: Jesse Jenner, Ralph Palumbo, Mark
21	Rowland, Philip McCune and Neill Taylor
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	Debbie Zurn - RPR, CRR - Federal Court Reporter - 700 Stewart Street - Suite 17205 - Seattle WA 98101

THE COURT: As we've had an intervening break, I'll 1 2 ask the clerk to please call roll.

THE CLERK: C-10-1823, Microsoft versus Motorola. 4 Counsel, please make your appearance.

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MR. HARRIGAN: Art Harrigan, Your Honor, representing Microsoft; and David Pritikin to my left, from Sidley; Andy Culbert; and my partner, Bruce Wion.

MR. PALUMBO: Ralph Palumbo for Motorola, with Jesse Jenner, Phillip McCune and Neill Taylor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, thank you for indulging the court, giving us a chance to go back and review the files in this matter, and having had the advantage of your argument this morning.

As a preliminary matter I should advise you that I have granted docket 208, which is Microsoft's motion to file documents under seal; and docket 247, Motorola's motion to file documents under seal. Both of those contain information that is appropriately commercial secrets and not generally available to the public.

That leaves docket 209, which is the sealed version of the motion for temporary restraining order; and 210, which is a slightly redacted version of the motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and the court's ruling will be in regards to those entries.

I must say I enjoyed this morning in that Mr. Jenner's

description of this as a "murky area" is a bit of an understatement. There is not a lot of law on the Anti-Suit Act.

I will begin by offering a perhaps more universal observation, which is the limited number of cases that there are seem to be guided in substantial part by some special interest or special significance of the aspects of the dispute which are in the United States.

The cases that deny relief under the Anti-Suit Act tend to involve situations where each country has an interest of roughly similar proportion in the particular dispute. And while none of the cases attempts to set out a bright line differentiating where that dichotomy breaks, it seems to me that it is very evident.

I have had the advantage of reviewing Microsoft's motion for a temporary restraining order, found in the docket at 209; Motorola's response in opposition, found in the docket at 248; Microsoft's reply, found in the docket at 257. Each and every one of those pleadings has been abundantly supported by declarations and attachments, and I've had the opportunity to review those. And finally, I've heard oral argument today. And the following will constitute the court's findings and conclusions:

Beginning with, what is the anti-suit standard? In considering an anti-suit motion the Ninth Circuit directs the

district courts to consider: No. 1, whether or not the
parties and the issues are the same, and whether or not the
first action is dispositive of the action to be enjoined;
No. 2, whether the foreign litigation would frustrate a
policy of the forum issuing the injunction; and No. 3,
whether the impact on comity would be tolerable.

That comes out of the Applied Medical Distribution

Corporation case, 587 F3d 909, and specifically at 913,

issued by the Ninth Circuit in 2009, and basically applying
the law that is found in the Gallo case, 446 F3d at 991 and

994.

The *Gallo* court indicated that a showing on the second factor could be replaced by any of three other rationales anticipated by *In Re: Unterweiser*, U-N-T-E-R-W-E-I-S-E-R, 428 F.2d 888 and 896 (the Fifth Circuit in 1970 affirmed on rehearing en banc at 446 F.2d 907 in 1971).

In our reading, that case shows that a foreign litigation frustrates the policy of the forum issuing the injunction in the circumstances where the foreign litigation is either vexatious or oppressive, would threaten the issuing courts in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, or where the proceedings prejudice other equitable considerations. Microsoft has also argued, including this morning, that other considerations set forth in the Seattle Totems Club are applicable to the second anti-suit factor.

I think that we are all in agreement that Ninth Circuit law is unclear whether the three anti-suit injunction factors replace all four of the Winter -- W-I-N-T-E-R -- standard preliminary injunction factors, or whether they replace only the requirement that the movant show a likelihood of success on the merits in the underlying claim. Gallo at 446 F.3d 991. Quoting, "Movant need not meet the usual test of likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim to obtain an anti-suit injunction. Rather, movant need only demonstrate that the specific factors to the anti-suit injunction weigh in favor of granting the injunction."

Under a literal reading of *Gallo*, a showing of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interests, might still be required to obtain an anti-suit injunction. However, the absence of any mention of the *Winter* factors in the *Applied Medical Distribution* court decision suggests otherwise.

Simply to make my ruling as complete as possible, I will go through the *Winter* factors, the three *Winter* factors of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest, in that they may arguably still be part of an anti-suit motion. But the parties should be aware that it's my belief that the crux of the anti-suit motion are the three-part tests set forth in *Gallo*.

So, beginning with irreparable harm, one of the *Winter* factors. Microsoft alleges, through the deposition of

Mr. Prito -- P-R-I-T-O -- that its contracts with its vendors
for Windows and Xbox will be severely affected by an
injunction issued by the German court. Motorola responds
that Microsoft may take advantage of the "orange book"
procedure under German law, to defend against an injunction
should one ever come into effect.

It is the court's view, however, that even if this is true, it would place Microsoft at the position of a negotiation in Germany with the threat of an immediate injunction hanging over its head. And that's something that seems to me to be a matter of some substantial harm.

And finally, Motorola argued for the first time today that were the German court to set a royalty rate too high, this court could still remedy that at a later date by requiring Motorola to pay the difference between the royalty rate set by Germany, and the rate set by this court. The court is not persuaded by this argument. Were the court to issue an injunction against Motorola enforcing a German injunction, it would not affect the German court's ability to award monetary damages in a patent infringement action then pending. So on balance, I think that the irreparable harm standard goes somewhat to Microsoft's favor.

The balance of hardships test, the second Winter factor.

The first thing that is of notice to the court is that if I

do nothing, Microsoft may need to begin removing Windows and

Internet Explorer products from the market, or face the negotiation under threat, which I mentioned earlier; while Motorola will simply be required to keep the status quo, if I grant the temporary restraining order, until this court can adjudicate the RAND issues before it. On that evaluation of the situation before me, I find that the balanced hardship tips in Microsoft's favor.

The third and final question under *Winter* is that of the public interest. And case law provides that the public interest in having disputes properly before an American court resolved in the United States as opposed to a foreign court is a legitimate matter of public interest. And secondly, that the public interest is in having standard essential patents being accessible to all comers under fair and just considerations. So I would find that the public interest would favor granting the temporary restraining order.

Having done that more out of caution than anything else, I'll then move on to the anti-suit injunction factors, which are in the mind of the court really the crux of this matter. The first of those is whether -- well, the test is whether or not the parties and the issues are the same, and whether or not the first action is dispositive of the foreign action to be enjoined. That's in the literature referred to most often as the "first step."

In this instance, in regards to that first step, the

parties are in agreement that more or less the same United

States and German actions -- the same parties are the same in
the United States and German actions.

That takes us then to really the battleground in this, which is whether the United States action, or resolution of it, would be dispositive of the foreign action to be enjoined. And I will add, for the edification of the Court of Appeals so it knows where I'm coming from, that I consider the preservation of my ability to resolve this dispute to be something that needs to be carefully guarded, otherwise we run into the possibilities of conflicting resolutions, duplicative litigation, and unfortunate results that don't follow appropriate law.

As has been correctly noted by Motorola and acknowledged by Microsoft, anti-suit injunctions are only appropriate when the domestic action is capable of disposing of all of the issues in the foreign action. And that's language that comes out of Applied Medical Distribution. That is a bright letter law principle that is more obeyed in theory than in practice, as the cases that are before me, many of them involve less than complete disposition of the foreign action but a substantial impact and an ability to preserve the authority of the United States court.

Therefore, I turn my analysis to the question that I asked in my order yesterday, in which the parties were kind enough

to discuss extensively during oral argument, which is what parts of this case would affect or dispose of some if not all of the action in Germany?

Microsoft contends that Motorola has submitted numerous patents to the International Telecommunications Union, known to the parties as the ITU as, "Declared essential patents to the H.264 video compression standards." In the submissions, which Mr. Jenner and I talked about this morning, Motorola declares to license its patents to, "An unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis, and on reasonable terms and conditions."

It is important to the court to note that the patents at issue in the German action are expressly subject to the ITU agreement at Motorola's inclusion. Motorola contends -- excuse me, Microsoft contends that Motorola's letter to Microsoft, found in the record, offering to grant Microsoft a worldwide license for Motorola's portfolio of declared essential patents relating to the ITU H.264 standard, violated Motorola's agreement with the ITU.

What I think is important in there, for reasons of this decision, is that Motorola offered both covered United States patents and non-U.S. patents in Motorola's portfolio, including the patents at issue in the German action. I find that to be inconsistent with the position taken by Motorola in this court.

It has been important to me to remember the following things about the lawsuit: First, it is between two American companies; secondly, it involves an ITU agreement with no apparent choice of law provision. I will acknowledge that some of the cases attach great significance to the presence of a choice of law provision, but we don't have one here. That, however, could go either direction and really leaves open the court to make this judgment regarding, does the United States have an interest in this matter?

Next, the offer letter from Motorola sent to Microsoft in the United States covers both the U.S. and foreign patents, and it is this offer letter which Microsoft alleges breaches the ITU agreement. Under these facts before the court, in my understanding, is the question of a determination of the worldwide RAND -- shorthand for what we've been talking about -- the RAND rate for Motorola's standard essential patents subject to the ITU agreement.

Motorola argues that Microsoft has not properly alleged this issue. However, having presided over this dispute now for several months, it has been widely discussed, and in fact the court has set up a framework for resolution of precisely that question, which has been set in the timeframe that Motorola argued that it needed. And therefore, I believe that it is properly alleged.

And finally I would note in regards to this, if Motorola

did not want its foreign patent subject to this court's jurisdiction, then it would not have provided them as part of the offer letter to Microsoft.

This particular issue is part of a larger dispute before the court that includes the issues of whether Motorola must offer licenses to the H.264 standard essential patents, subject to the ITU agreement on RAND terms. Next, whether Motorola's offers in its letters breached any such obligations. Third, whether Motorola may seek an injunction for any standard essential patents.

In this instance were the German court to issue an injunction, it would sharply usurp the ability of this court to determine whether or not an injunction is appropriate.

And conversely, were this court to determine that an injunction for any standard essential patent was improper, it would dispose of the issue in the German action with respect to the issuance of an injunction, the subject of Microsoft's present motion.

And lastly, this court has before it and has had before it now for an extended period of time, and a great deal of legal work, the question whether Microsoft is entitled to a RAND license and subsequently determining the RAND rate. Such adjudication of these issues is inappropriate to a German court injunction. Indeed, there is no reason the German court cannot go forward with its application of German patent

infringement law and damages without usurping this court's ability to make such adjudications.

That is the first step in the anti-suit injunction standard. The second is whether the foreign litigation would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction. As set forth in *Applied Medical*, the second step in deciding if an anti-suit injunction is appropriate is determining if the continuation of the foreign litigation would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction.

Courts have found that the court's policies against avoiding inconsistent judgments, forum shopping, and engaging in duplicative and vexatious litigation is sufficient to satisfy this step. Here this prong has been met because this court's policy against inconsistent judgments, the German court issuing an injunction while this court finding no injunction justified is a possibility, and the forum shopping, vexatious litigation, an end-run around the litigation here in order to achieve the injunction goal in Germany, are certainly possible.

The court frankly has concerns that Motorola pulled two patents out of the list of patents that are around 100, offered in the letter to Microsoft, which is the crux of this litigation, and it sued on them in Germany, before a court with a different legal standard, and before this court could adjudicate those issues.

The final and third step under the anti-suit test is, "The third step in deciding if an anti-suit injunction is appropriate is determining whether the impact on comity would be tolerable." Once again citing Allied Medical Distributors, 587 F3d at 919. As I mentioned, this is the final step in determining the appropriateness of the anti-suit injunction.

Typically courts have said that comity concerns are alleviated through the parties' agreement to litigation in a certain jurisdiction, ie: a choice of law provision in a contract. We do not have that here. Despite the lack of choice of law provision, the concerns of comity are alleviated in this instance because of the concern on the part of this court that a foreign court is being asked to limit this court's ability to adjudicate the issues properly before it. The support for that statement can be found in the Laker Airways case, 731 F.2d 909 from the DC Circuit in 1984.

For the reasons discussed when I talked about why the United States has a special interest in this matter, I find that it is something of special interest to the United States court system, given that the parties have initiated this litigation here on a more inclusive basis.

In this instance, the need of the court to maintain the integrity of this action is as important or more important

than accommodation of the substantially more limited German interests. The *Laker* case also stands authority for this proposition.

Therefore, I find that under the three tests set forth in the anti-suit matrix, that each of them favors the issuance of an injunction in this matter. Therefore, the court grants the motion for temporary restraining order. It will issue a short one-page order setting forth the actual terms of it. They will incorporate the following:

The court, applying the factors in *Gallo* for an anti-suit injunction, grants Microsoft's motion for a temporary restraining order found in the docket at 209. The injunction is limited -- I stress -- is limited to enjoining Motorola from enforcing any injunctive relief it may receive in the German actions that were the subject of Microsoft's motion, without further leave of this court. Therefore, you're not rid of me.

This temporary restraining order shall remain in effect until the court's ruling on docket 236, which is subject to a hearing scheduled for, I believe it's May 7, 2012. It seems to me that the outcome of that particular motion for partial summary judgment could have an impact on where we go next.

Finally, given the relatively limited duration and the argument that I heard this morning, I find that Microsoft shall post a security bond in the amount of \$100 million US

dollars in connection with this motion. 1 2 As I said, that portion of the order will come out in 3 written form to satisfy the provisions of Civil Rule 65. The court's oral opinion will justify -- will have the effect of 4 5 being the reasons why I'm issuing the TRO at this time. Mr. Harrigan, anything further on behalf of Microsoft? 6 7 MR. HARRIGAN: No, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jenner? 9 MR. JENNER: Nothing here, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, thank you very It's been an interesting pursuit, not one that I would 11 have predicted where it turned out, because it's decided on 12 much different grounds than we started off on. We will be in 13 14 recess. Thank you, counsel. 15 (The proceedings recessed.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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## CERTIFICATE

I, Debbie K. Zurn, RPR, CRR, Court Reporter for the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington at Seattle, do hereby certify that I was present in court during the foregoing matter and reported said proceedings stenographically.

I further certify that thereafter, I have caused said stenographic notes to be transcribed under my direction and that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription to the best of my ability.

Dated this 11th day of April, 2012.

/s/ <u>Debbi e Zurn</u>

Debbie Zurn