UK-UPC relations enter into Cold War phase or worse with new court order accusing UPC of unfairness while reflecting UK’s Soviet negotiation style

1. “Declaration”: quotation marks make mockery of UPC’s peace proposal, but the Mannheim LD’s objective of lasting peace got lost in translation

In the EWHC judgment there are seven occurences of the word “declaration” in quotes, referring to Amazon saying that it would not seek . As mentioned further above, Mr Justice Meade effectively ridicules it as something unenforceable and noncommittal. He even calls it “performative”, which adds insult to injury.

There was one and only one reservation that the Mannheim LD said at the February 27, 2026 hearing (which no media outlet or member of the general public other than ip fray attended) it would allow Amazon to make: should it prevail on appeal, that would be a game changer. Other than that, the Mannheim LD aimed at a definitive resolution of the issue, eliminating any risk whatsoever that Amazon could later seek damages in the UK from InterDigital over the latter’s hypothetical non-compliance with an equally hypothetical (not as to whether it will happen, but concerning the scope) UK ruling that its entitled to a patent license on court-determined terms, the specific type of hypothetical non-compliance raising the Mannheim LD’s concerns being anything based on InterDigital’s actions in the UPC (filing of lawsuits; pursuit of claims; enforcement of decisions and orders).

1.1 Here’s what went wrong: ambiguity arose from German-to-English translation (whether or not Amazon strategically capitalized on it)

The relevant German term for what Amazon was expected to do is Erklärung. The common English translation is indeed declaration (unless it means explanation, which is obviously not the case here and in which cases Germans often use Erläuterung to disambiguate), but it is not appropriate in this particular case:

Amazon was expected to make a commitment to the effect of a waiver. It was not merely expected to say something legally irrelevant. The distinction was clear to any reasonable observer because the Mannheim LD’s discussion, in open court, of a structure involving mutual conditions subsequent would have been pointless for anything non-binding. In fact, for a non-binding declaration there would not even have been a point in telling Amazon to go the UK court for that purpose: it would have been enough for Amazon to make such a declaration in the UPC alone.

The German word Erklärung (again, in contexts where it definitely does not mean explanation) has scope for binding as well as non-binding declarations. Here are some uses:

• Political declarations without legal force:
  • The official German translation of the Univeral Declaration of Human Rights is “Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte” (emphases added).
  • The 1950 Schuman-Erklärung, named after a French foreign minister, was a proposal by the French government to unite Europe (official EU web page (German)).
• Non-binding declarations are sometimes called Absichtserklärung (declaration of intent).
• But an Erklärung can also be legally binding. In that case it is called a Willenserklärung (declaration of will):
  • A contract under German law is constituted by two consistent Willenserklärungen (declarations of will: i.e., offer and acceptance, with German law not requiring what is called a consideration, in a transactional and not deliberative sense, in U.S. law).
  • In German procedural law, Willenserklärungen are also made in connection with legal proceedings. They are called prozessuale Willenserklärungen (declarations of will concerning legal proceedings), sometimes expressed shortly as prozessuale Erklärungen, Prozesserklärungen, or just Erklärungen. The first such Erklärung is, in fact, the complaint with which a litigation starts. Its withdrawal or the declaration of consent by the other party is the final Erklärung in a settled case. And there is room for numerous types of Erklärungen in between.

This confusion between a meaningless and a meaningful declaration vindicates the Mannheim LD’s preference for conducting the InterDigital v. Amazon anti-interference main proceedings in German, given that the original ex parte injunction was also entered in German.

1.2 Is Amazon guilty of malicious compliance? Or is it a failure to comply? Can it be cured?

This question cannot be answered without knowing how Amazon communicated with its UPC and UK counsel, and all such communication is privileged, with an extremely high hurdle even for courts seeking information. And we also lack access to any written order by the Mannheim LD further to the February 27, 2026 hearing, so all the information we have is based on what was said in open court. Therefore, the following is purely hypothetical:

• If UK counsel told Amazon that the declaration to the UK court would not have any teeth, and if Amazon had received (subsequently or previously) explanations from its UPC counsel that the UPC meant Erklärung in a binding sense, then this would not merely be non-compliance: it would be malicious compliance, meaning that a party purposely interprets a law, an order or guidance from a court in an unreasonable way to see if it will get away with it.
• At minimum, this is a case of non-compliance unless the Mannheim LD softened its stance after the public part (which appeared to be the critical part) of the February 27, 2026 hearing and indicated that it would content itself with a gesture.

Either way, the problem could still be cured if

• Amazon went back to the UK court with a formal application, explaining that the March 5, 2026 order is insufficient to solve the problem at hand, and
• Mr Justice Meade agreed to enter an enforceable order.

For the first part to happen, the UPC would have to remind Amazon of its obligations. For the second part, Mr Justice Meade would have to do more than the Thursday order suggests he is prepared to do.

1.3 Should InterDigital have protested?

If InterDigital did not object to the non-binding nature of the “declaration”, it means nothing. InterDigital is acting under duress. Therefore, the Mannheim LD has to put itself in the shoes of an InterDigital unaffected by overtly and subtly coercive actions in the UK, and determine what steps it must take of its own volition in order to offset or at least counterbalance the effects of foreign coercion.

1.4 Almost three months until CoA hearing, possibly four to five until CoA ruling

The Mannheim LD may or may not determine that Amazon’s sham compliance is good enough for the time being, and await the outcome of the appeal before spending more time on this and creating more friction.

The appellate hearing is almost three months away, and there is no guarantee that the CoA will rule at the end of the hearing, even though it is a preliminary injunction (PI) appeal. When there are critical issues, it can take more time. The hearing in the aforementioned Dyson v. Dreame long-arm case was held on January 22, 2026, but the decision only came down this month of March. That was a PI case, too.

There is another compliance issue here and it will be discussed in the next paragraph.

2. Lingering threat of UK sanctions on InterDigital as a result of Amazon’s breach of the UPC anti-interference injunction

Para. 91 (“Conclusion”) of the UK order says:

“I will as necessary and appropriate return to the matter after the UPC appeal. I have decided not to make any order of my own motion against InterDigital on this occasion but reserve the right to reconsider that in future if necessary and appropriate, which I hope and expect it never will be.”

Of course, everyone involved with those proceedings hopes that sua sponte sanctions by the EWHC on InterDigital can be avoided. But hope is not a guarantee.

The EWHC order faults InterDigital for what it did (and what it did not do) in the UPC. Mr Justice Meade wanted InterDigital to narrow its UPC claim so the anti-interference injunction there would explicitly not cover “final relief” in the UK, meaning whatever might result from a post-trial decision. For a recap, Mr Justice Meade attached to the latest order the remedies sought by Amazon, among them the following:

In the alternative to [declaring the acquisition of the relevant patents by InterDigital void], specific performance of [acquired company] Thomson’s obligation to transfer its RAND¹ Commitment to InterDigital, alternatively damages for breach of the RAND Commitment against Thomson in an amount to be assessed.

As we discussed in our hearing report on Thursday, Mr Justice Meade asked InterDigital to justify its defense against Amazon’s UPC appeal and sought to persuade it from conceding the appeal.

All of this, however, results from Amazon having obtained an antisuit injunction (styled as an “anti-antisuit injunction” (AASI)) in the UK after InterDigital’s anti-interference injunction (AII),² despite the AII prohibiting retaliatory measures. If the AII was the equivalent of an AASI, then it also came with an AAAASI. Arguably, it was an AAASI that came with an AAAAAASI (October 22, 2025 ip fray article). Regardless of the eact number of As, there was a mechanism designed to prevent Amazon from undermining the AII through foreign actions.

The question for the UPC is now whether to tolerate that Amazon has literally done nothing to remove this Damocles sword from above InterDigital’s head. If one expected Amazon to do “whatever it takes” to achieve that objective, it would have to withdraw its UK antisuit motion, and if the court declined, it would have to try harder, such as by voluntarily dismissing the UK FRAND claim as a whole. Even if the UK court declined to bless such dismissal, there is nothing it could do if Amazon stopped participating in the proceedings. Without Amazon presenting expert evidence etc., the FRAND case would go nowhere. The UK court couldn’t seriously force Amazon to litigate a complex FRAND claim if it doesn’t want to do it anymore. Of course, the first step would be a stay pending the UPC CoA decision.

The possibility of InterDigital still being sanctioned by the UK court is another deficiency that shows Amazon is not complying the way it could and should.

3. Is this a face-saving exit for the EWHC?

One perspective that the UPC could take in the face of flagrant non-compliance is that the criticism leveled at the UPC and the way in which the “declaration” is ridiculed is simply a necessary evil in order to defuse the situation. The Mannheim judges might think to themselves that if this is what it takes to provide the EWHC with a face-saving exit, so be it.

The problems are, however, serious. This is about whether even the world’s largest companies (Big Tech) respect the UPC and whether the UPC respects itself. It’s also about whether the UK courts will cease to encroach on other jurisdictions.

It’s possible that nothing will happen now. We don’t have a crystal ball. But it’s also possible that Amazon will have to do more to bring its conduct into compliance.

4. The house of cards rests on three pillars

Everything that the EWHC judgment says about how the UPC and InterDigital are to be blamed for the mess is easily debunked by simply bearing three facts in mind:

4.1 FALSE: InterDigital obtained an ASI from the UPC to deprive Amazon of rights — TRUE: Amazon and the UK drew first blood to deprive InterDigital of universally recognized rights

The EWHC judgment refers to the UK AII as an ASI. It faults InterDigital for the initiatives taken by the UPC. It essentially says the UPC engaged in the opposite of de-escalation.

But Amazon ran to the UK court, even prior to any enforcement action (though it likely had a reasonable apprehension of infringement lawsuits). Amazon sought a court ruling designed not to protect its rights in the UK (where the case law by the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) and the other relevant courts ensures that no injunction will be enforced without a judicial FRAND determination), but to undermine foreign proceedings. And the English courts are more than happy to let themselves be used for that purpose.

InterDigital’s AII was merely a response. It was the first SEP holder with a “we’re not gonna take it anymore” attitude, and ip fray knows that other SEP holders are glad that InterDigital is fighting this fight, and that even UPC representatives who exclusively or predominantly defend implementers consider the Amazon-InterDigital situation a frontal assault on the UPC’s authority.

The UK judiciary has now repeatedly denied motions to decline FRAND jurisdiction over patents that are undisputedly non-SEPs. That fact alone makes the UK a rogue jurisdiction in this context, and other jurisdictions are now starting to push back. The sooner the UK judiciary all the way up to the UKSC, which through Unwired Planet v. Huawei created the ill-conceived root cause of overreach and antisuit wars, realizes that its country simply lacks the economic and political clout to do this, the better for everyone.

4.2 FALSE: InterDigital actually wants Amazon to go ahead with full UK FRAND relief, but UPC doesn’t respect parties’ will — TRUE: No free will under duress

The UK judgment suggests that the UPC disregards what the parties really want, which it says is for all antisuit type of motions to be withdrawn and Amazon to obtain “final relief” in the UK, with worldwide effect.

But the UPC does the right thing by distinguishing between that which InterDigital says against the backdrop of what has been threatened in the UK (explicitly and implicitly and in so many ways) and that which a party in InterDigital’s shoes would want without the UK’s jurisdictional imperialism.

InterDigital is not free to say and do what it wants. Some interpretations of the initial UK ASI and remarks at a hearing may have gone too far, though the wordings could have a reasonable reader concerned. But it is clear that the EWHC is treating this here as a power struggle and leverage game.

Para. 88 of the UK order talks about “extremely sophisticated and well-advised litigants who do not need supervision when they settle claims”, but nowhere did the UPC suggest that it knew better than the parties or that the parties needed parental oversight. The UPC has to act because one party faces severe restrictions.

The EWHC’s concern over the Mannheim LD “compel[ling] InterDigital to maintain an anti-suit injunction that it is prepared to release” reflects the UK court’s preferred way forward, but not reality. With nothing to fear, no litigant would be interested in abandoning an injunction it obtained unless there is a complete settlement in the form of a license agreement.

The same paragraph (para. 89) suggests that the Mannheim LD’s stance places an unnecessary burden on the UPC CoA. But judicial economy at the UPC is not the issue when it is so obvious that a party makes concessions not because of a good deal but because of pressure from the UK.

4.3 FALSE: UPC and InterDigital changed mind or took inconsistent views on scope of initial UPC injunction — TRUE: It was clear from the beginning, and part of the problem is that InterDigital can’t act freely (see 4.2)

There is no intellectual or general dishonesty there on the UPC’s or InterDigital’s part:

• The UPC’s initial order (October 3, 2025 ip fray article) was clear. It prohibited anything that impairs InterDigital’s ability to enforce patents in the UPC. All references to an interim license are merely specific examples, but the prohibition itself was not confined to an interim license.
• This was clear from the get-go and couldn’t work any other way: if interference is the action to be prevented, such interference becomes worse, not better, if it lasts for a longer period.
• PIs in the UPC, just like in Germany, require the combination of a sense of urgency (which is where interim licenses come into play, as do expedited trials) and a meritorious claim. If the anti-interference claim was not meritorious against “final relief”, then there’s no way it could be meritorious against interim licenses.
• If the EWHC guaranteed InterDigital that it could speak freely without anything to fear, it would get different answers.

By contrast, the EWHC was blatantly inconsistent at the early stages of this antisuit war:

• InterDigital’s counsel was accused of having mischaracterized UK law in a sworn declaration submitted with the UPC and the Munich I Regional Court on the risk of Amazon seeking an ex parte ASI to thwart an AII motion by InterDigital.
• But not long thereafter, the same court indeed granted Amazon an ex parte ASI.

5. The UPC’s approach does not avoid all overreach, yet it is far more workable and compatible with comity

5.1 ip fray promotes interjurisdictional peace

ip fray is not in one particular camp. Our proposal for interjurisdictional peace (March 1, 2026 ip fray article) was welcomed by a senior licensing executive of one of the world’s largest implementers as a comprehensive plan to address all controversial issues at once. Other positions may have been welcomed by SEP holders.

If overreach could not be avoided through an agreement between litigants, narrowly tailored ASIs that merely prevent coercion by the enjoined party with respect to the enjoining jurisdiction’s patents would be preferable (February 25, 2026 ip fray article).

5.2 The answer does not lie in arbitrarily chosen terms: coercive overreach is the criterion

It is irrelevant whether an injunction is called an ASI, AASI, AILI, AII, or whatever. It does not even matter whether jurisdictional overreach is enforced by means of any injunction. All that matters is whether there is coercive overreach. The UPC rightly identified damages claims as having the potential to achieve the same effect.

5.3 Soviet negotiation style

The EWHC treats the UPC’s self-defense as overreach because the English courts believe that their own overreach is a God-given right.

That makes it a Soviet negotiation style: unless a litigant in the UK can obtain remedies of coercive effect (“What’s mine is mine”), other jurisdictions are accused of disregarding comity. The judgment refers to UK law allowing such claims. There is no reason whatsoever why courts in other countries could not equally point to what their laws allow.

The “and what’s yours is negotiable” part is that any concessions the EWHC would be fine with Amazon making would be cosmetic at best. The dogma is still that the UK must resolve the global dispute, and the rest of the world must capitulate.

5.4 Forum conveniens

The starting point of the EWHC’s positions here is that it does the world a service by resolving global FRAND disputes. It does not, however, mention that in most cases, one party chooses the UK and the other opposes that choice.

Apart from one appellate decision (ZTE’s successful appeal against Samsung: October 31, 2025 ip fray article), the English courts have assumed SEP jurisdiction regardless of how unreasonable this was from a forum (non) conveniens point of view. It all started with Unwired v. Huawei and Conversant v. ZTE (two parallel cases).

Until that horrible case law is consigned to the dustbin of SEP litigation history (maybe through a legislative override resulting from trade pressure), no English court can accuse (though the new judgment does it) the UPC of not proposing a more suitable jurisdiction in which Amazon should assert its FRAND rights. The new judgment criticizes the UPC for disallowing Amazon’s conduct regardless of the jurisdiction in which it may seek certain orders, but that is actually principled. Even if the UPC suggested some other venue, the likelihood of the UK courts agreeing on a superior forum choice is still extremely low. And that’s not the only issue here. There’s an even more fundamental problem with that accusation of a breach of comity by the Mannheim LD. The Mannheim LD allows, and has always allowed, Amazon to enforce its FRAND rights in myriad ways:

• Amazon can raise a FRAND defense or even counterclaim in the UPC and other courts.
• Amazon can litigate FRAND even in the UK and even seek damages, but not in any way that compromises UPC litigation from complaint to enforcement.
• There are any number of ways in which Amazon can use FRAND as an affirmative defense, such as in the U.S., without the UPC being opposed to that in any way.

5.4 UPC/German approach to FRAND not perfect, but far more workable than the UK system

Of course, interjurisdictional peace would best. It would arguably also be best if narrowly tailored antisuit injunctions tackled only overreach as opposed to prohibiting injunctions against infringement. But here’s a simple thought experiment:

What if all relevant jurisdictions did what the English courts do in this regard (global FRAND determinations after very costly trials, and coercive measures at different stages) versus what if everyone did what the UPC and the German courts do?

The former would mean mayhem; the latter would, at worst, mean supra-FRAND royalties. License fees should be FRAND, not supra-FRAND, but the UK approach does nothing to make the SEP licensing process less costly. In the end, consumers have to bear the costs. And the UK approach creates friction between jurisdictions as everyone can see now.

6. No reliance on media reports

The following two consecutive paragraphs effectively relate to the UPC having read about certain developments on ip fray:

1. The UPC LD became aware of my 4 February hearing at some point and made its own Order of 6 February 2026 requiring from the parties an explanation of my hearing. From the tone of its Order, it seems that it was concerned that Amazon had made an application to force InterDigital to limit its UPC ASI.
2. I would entirely have understood if that was the UPC LD’s concern, and I appreciate that, at the time, its knowledge of what was discussed at my hearing may have come only from internet reports made in haste.

6.1 Motion or not: Amazon sought to leverage UK overreach

There is the conjecture that the UPC was concerned about Amazon having brought a formal UK motion to obligate InterDigital to narrow its UPC injunction. The UPC obviously needs to investigate that question with a view to potential contempt-of-court sanctions. However, if the conclusion was that Amazon did not specifically do so, the situation was still created by Amazon having sought a UK ASI after InterDigital’s UPC AII. In the end, the difference is gradual and relates to what Amazon should do.

Amazon said nothing at the relevant hearing that suggested it didn’t want InterDigital to be put under additional pressure. Much to the contrary, Amazon “negotiated” with InterDigital (using the UK court’s threats as leverage).

6.2 Accuracy of hearing reports

• We appreciate the transparency of those proceedings. While ip fray has indeed taken positions that are irreconcilable with those of the English courts, the sole reason is Unwired v. Huawei.
• Unfortunately, the audio quality of live transmissions from such UK hearings is notoriously low. Others say so, too. And in the England & Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA), there have even been hearings where people sitting at the back of the room found it harder to understand what was said than those following via YouTube. By contrast, U.S. court hearings at all levels of the federal court system (to the extent that online access is possible) and also ECJ hearings are far easier to follow remote.
• The UK court system is more transparent than, for example, the German one. But documents filed by the parties are either unavailable or available only with major delay. It would actually be good if the parties’ skeleton arguments could be downloaded from a court website.

We are comfortable that the level of accuracy of our hearing reports is high. That does not mean that we can know what is contained in documents not publicly accessible at the relevant time.

6.3 Courts have every right to read reports and ask questions

The UPC, just like the EWHC, may inform itself of developments from whatever source. Of course, if it imposed contempt sanctions on a party like Amazon based on a report by ip fray or whomever, that would not be appropriate unless the information has been verified. At all times, however, the UPC made it clear that it would establish the facts, which may include testimony, should sanctions be imposed. It could also rely on undisputed facts. But it was not going to act on hearsay.

The primary reason for which the UPC is forced to resort to such sources of information is that InterDigital has been under duress since the UK ASI. Even the most recent hearing did nothing to alleviate that concern. InterDigital was even asked to justify its opposition to Amazon’s UPC appeal. The mere question raises greater comity concerns than many injunctions.

7. Communication between courts

Mr Justice Meade definitely means well in the part about communication between courts. He would like to open a communication channel between the courts.

The problem is that regardless of all the shortcomings of indirect communications, there are jurisdictions where the judges couldn’t simply engage in direct exchanges about their cases, with a few exceptions that are unrelated to patent litigation.

It is now clear, based on para. 65, that the “third party” from whom a document was submitted by Amazon on the eve of the February 27, 2026 hearing was the EWHC:

I should also mention that sometimes communication takes place by the parties passing on to Court A what they have been communicating with Court B. For example, on 26 February I was in communication with the parties in the context of potential agreed de-escalation to ensure that it was agreed to be clear that InterDigital did not consider that final RAND relief was blocked by the UPC LD ASI; I said I was content for the communication to be passed to the UPC, as I thought might be useful, which I think happened since there is a reference in the agreed note of the 27 February UPC LD hearing to “the filing by a ‘third party’” (not an accurate characterisation). I imagine therefore that the UPC LD was aware of the parties’ positions on the scope of the ASI, but whether or not that is so, this is a haphazard and indirect way of information being passed on court-to-court.

The criticism of the characterization as a “third party” is unfounded. The Mannheim LD actually did a good job because even though we strongly suspected Amazon submitted a message for the UPC from the EWHC, the term was so broad that we could not be sure. From that perspective, we are sure the UPC did not mean that term disrespectfully. Without a doubt, the objective was to find the most generic of terms.

Mr Justice Meade also feels that transcripts of his proceedings are being used unfairly. It is true that the Mannheim LD told Amazon that what judges state or ask at hearings does not necessarily constitute an actual position, and Mr Justice Meade says the same. However, it is the backdrop of coercion (against InterDigital) that forces the UPC to gather evidence that way. It’s difficult for a court to establish the facts when one party can’t say what it would normally say.

What is going on here threatens to cause, and may already have caused, lasting damage to the relationship between the UPC and the English courts.

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1. RAND is the same as FRAND. There are differences between the pledges required by various standard-setting organizations, but that one letter in the label does not change the scope or effect. ↩︎
2. This is not the official term used by any of the courts, but the original title of the injunction as proposed by InterDigital, “anti-interim-license injunction” (AILI), would be confusing at this stage where Amazon is no longer pursuing an interim license and the UPC has clarified that the scope of the injunction is not confined to the prohibition of the pursuit of an interim license. ↩︎