Nokia challenges patent pool benchmarks in UK royalty trial against Paramount and Warner Bros.

Context: In November 2025, Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD) and Paramount initiated proceedings against Nokia before the High Court of England and Wales, seeking a court-determined reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) license for Nokia’s video patent portfolio. In February 2026, the parties agreed to resolve their global licensing dispute through a UK court determination, with parallel litigation withdrawn and interim payments arranged. Paramount subsequently completed its acquisition of WBD on October 6, 2026, bringing both streaming businesses under the control of Skydance Corporation.

What’s new: Today (November 18, 2026), a RAND rate-setting trial began before the High Court of England and Wales, with Justice James Mellor presiding. Nokia’s skeleton argument reveals substantial disagreements over the valuation of its video patent portfolio, including the use of historical patent pool rates, the treatment of non-essential patents and the financial scope of the proposed global license.

Direct impact: The trial will establish the licensing terms governing Nokia’s video patents for Skydance’s streaming businesses, including HBO Max, Discovery+, Paramount+ and Pluto TV. The court’s determination will address both standard-essential and non-essential patents, with potentially significant financial consequences depending on the royalty methodology adopted and the treatment of past use.

Wider ramifications: The proceedings could provide further guidance on RAND valuation beyond conventional telecommunications disputes, particularly where comprehensive global licenses encompass multiple video compression standards and non-essential patents. The outcome may influence how video technology patent holders and streaming providers approach future licensing negotiations.

Historical patent pool rates versus bilateral licensing comparables

A central disagreement in the trial concerns whether historical patent pool rates or more recent bilateral licensing agreements provide a reliable benchmark for valuing Nokia’s video patent portfolio. WBD and Paramount primarily rely on the MPEG LA AVC patent pool’s 2003 licensing framework, which capped annual subscription streaming royalties at $100,000 for services exceeding one million subscribers. Nokia argues that those rates were established before the emergence of the modern streaming market and cannot adequately reflect the commercial value of video compression technologies today.

According to Nokia’s skeleton argument, the claimants’ primary valuation methodology produces royalties of approximately $13,500 annually for each company, despite WBD and Paramount generating approximately $10.9 billion and $8.6 billion, respectively, in streaming-related revenues in 2025. Nokia also challenges the claimants’ primary position that the applicable HEVC royalty should be zero, emphasizing the technology’s role in enabling commercially valuable services such as 4K and high dynamic range (HDR) streaming. In their statement Nokia stated: “We believe that this contribution should be appropriately recognized through fair and reasonable licensing arrangements and welcome the opportunity to have the appropriate licensing terms determined through the UK court process.”

Nokia instead favors contemporary bilateral licensing agreements, principally its 2025 agreement with streaming provider Starz and two other confidential agreements, to establish a per-subscriber monthly royalty. It also uses more recent video patent pools, including Access Advance’s Video Distribution Patent (VDP) pool and Avanci Video, as cross-checks.

Beyond the age of the comparables, Nokia disputes the assumption that patent pool rates can be proportionally scaled according to patent counts. It argues that pools may offer discounted rates to encourage participation and that individual patents differ in technical significance, commercial relevance and licensing value. Nokia, which did not participate in the MPEG LA AVC pool, maintains that its portfolio is more valuable than the average portfolio represented in the relevant pools. The court must assess which licensing benchmarks are most informative and what adjustments are necessary to account for differences in portfolio value and licensing structures.

Non-essential patents and the value of patent peace

Another significant disagreement concerns the treatment of non-standard-essential patents within the proposed global license. Although the parties agreed to apply the International Telecommunication Union’s RAND licensing standard to Nokia’s broader video patent portfolio for the purposes of the proceedings, they disagree over the value attributable to patents that are not essential to implementing a particular standard.

Nokia argues that WBD and Paramount effectively seek to include non-SEPs without assigning them additional economic value. Its skeleton identifies 10,163 video-related non-SEPs across 3,757 patent families and distinguishes between patents supported by infringement claim charts exchanged during negotiations and the broader protection against potential patent litigation commonly described as patent peace. The parties’ licensing experts acknowledge that patent peace can carry economic value, although they differ over its treatment in licensing negotiations. Nokia argues that conventional SEP pools do not provide equivalent protection against claims involving pool members’ non-essential patents, making unadjusted pool rates an incomplete measure of the rights covered by the proposed license.

Nokia proposes treating claim-charted non-SEPs as having equivalent value to SEPs for the purposes of calculating an additional royalty adjustment. The resulting uplift would be greater for WBD than for Paramount since Nokia identified more applicable claim-charted non-SEPs for WBD. Nokia acknowledges that this approach is approximate and excludes non-SEPs without infringement claim charts, even though they would fall within the broader license.

Indirect subscribers, past royalties and interest

Beyond the applicable royalty rate, the parties disagree over the subscriber base and retrospective period used to calculate the total payment. One issue concerns subscriptions distributed through third-party channel partners, including Amazon Prime Video, Roku and Sky. Nokia distinguishes between partners that direct subscribers to streaming services’ own applications and those that host and deliver content through their own platforms. WBD and Paramount seek to exclude certain categories of indirect subscribers or apply substantially reduced rates.

Nokia opposes these exclusions, arguing that subscribers receive access to the same underlying video content regardless of the distribution channel. It particularly challenges a proposed one-thirtieth rate for certain indirect subscriptions, maintaining that the discount does not reflect differences in the economic value of video compression technology. Nokia also argues that excluding channel-partner subscribers could force it to pursue licensing arrangements with hundreds of intermediaries. It therefore favors applying the same rate to direct and indirect subscribers, subject to protections against double payment.

The parties also disagree over retrospective royalties. WBD and Paramount primarily argue that payments should begin around September or October 2022, when Nokia first contacted them about licensing. Nokia instead seeks royalties dating back to 2011, relying on InterDigital v. Lenovo and Optis v. Apple to argue that willing licensees should compensate patent holders for past use regardless of when negotiations began.

Nokia seeks 5% compounded interest on unpaid royalties, while the claimants favor either no interest or a lower rate based on U.S. Treasury yields. These disagreements could materially affect the overall license payment independently of the royalty rate ultimately determined by the court.

What the dispute could mean for future video patent licensing

The trial raises a broader question about the extent to which royalty rates established through collective licensing arrangements can serve as benchmarks for independently negotiated licenses. Patent pools are designed to facilitate access to multiple portfolios through standardized terms, while bilateral licensing may reflect different commercial incentives, negotiation dynamics and assessments of individual patent rights.

The distinction becomes particularly relevant when pool rates are used to value portfolios containing patents of varying technical significance and commercial relevance. Even where patent counts provide a starting point for comparison, they may not capture differences in the actual contribution of patented inventions. The dispute could therefore help clarify whether, and under what circumstances, quantitative adjustments are sufficient to make otherwise dissimilar licensing arrangements comparable. The proceedings also highlight the challenges of establishing a single royalty for technologies used across different streaming services, distribution channels and video codecs. A comprehensive license may resolve overlapping patent exposures that would otherwise require multiple negotiations, raising questions about how the commercial benefits of such arrangements should be reflected in the price. The judgment’s significance will ultimately depend on whether the court articulates principles governing these valuation questions or confines its findings to the particular evidence presented.